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Scciceconomic representativeness is very important
because it is one of the major equity issues in manpower
procurement, and it influences military effectiveness- The
U.S. Army, in the light of socioeconomic consideration, has
had mere severe problems than other services since the start
of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
.
This thesis examined the socioeconomic characteristics
of Army personnel who enlisted during the period between
July 1, 1970 and September 30, 1984. The purpose was to
determine if any trends in the socioeconomic characteristics
were apparent during that period. This period includes the
transition from the draft to the AVF. The socioeconomic
characteristics of 1982 Army enlistees were compared with
the U.S. population cf 1982. This was done to determine
the scciceconomic representativeness of the Army's enlistees
in that particular year. In addition, the socioeconomic
overview of Republic cf Korea in the military is presented
in Appendix A. In conclusion, this study indicates that the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has vital interests in the Republic of
Korea (ECK) , because "the maintenance of the peace and
security on the Korean peninsula is •essential* to peace and
security of east Asia, and is 'vital 1 to the security of the
United States." 1 As that countermeasure, to keep the mili-
tary balance in the Korean peninsula, the United States
deploys the 2nd Infantry Divisions in the Army as well as
forces from other services. 2 Also, Joint Operation Exercises
such as Team Spirit, the largest of the Joint Exercises in
the Democratic parts, is held annually in Korea. Whenever
Joint Operation Exercises occured, we (author) witnessed
that the U.S. Army had many blacks and some of them were
very poor in writing and calculating.
In December 1980, data from the 2nd Infantry Divisions
show that black enlistment rates is roughly 41.1%: Infantry
41.33; Armor 38%; Artillery 47.6%; Engineers 31.9%; Signal
57.6%. At that time, the black proportion in the army was
30% and the blacks in the total population was 18%.
[Ref. 1]
These facts are demonstrated in some of the following
questions. fJhy does the U.S. Army consist of a large
percentage of blacks? Why is the 'burden of defense' in the
U.S.,— of the people, by the people and for the people--,
unfair? Is the U.S. Army a representative force? Dees the
U.S. Army have unit cohesion between whites and blacks? Is
the "quality" of U.S. Army enlisted personnel adequate?
,
1 Ihis is derived from the joint statement between Korea
and U.S. (Nov. 14, 1983), and between Korea and Japan (Sep.
8, 1984)
.
' b \ t
2 There are about 40,000 members among U.S. soldiers in
Korea (1985). 3
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These concerns of the U.S. Army may be viewed as a sign of
weakness. These facts pertain to our concerns because there
are many differences between The Bepublic of Korea (EOK) and
the United States. 3
In June 1973, President Nixon changed from the peacetime
draft to the All- Volunteer Force (AVF) . But the debate
concerning America's AVF (especially the Army) is more
controversial than before in the issue of representation.
Seme critics of the AVF charge that the quality of
accessions is not representative of the population at large
and that the distribution of the burden of service in the
AVF is falling disproportionately on the poor and on minori-
ties, especially in the enlisted combat forces. [Bef. 2].
Also, some national leaders--bcth blacks and white— hold
that a disproportionately black force puts an unfair burden
on black Americans, particularly in the initial stage of
military hostilities. [Bef, 3]. As an example, if the 2nd
Infantry Division became involved in hostilities on the
Korean peninsula, black soldiers would be likely to suffer
41. 1^ of the early casualties, based on the racial mix in
the Division. Other observers question the reliability of
an unrepresentative force, particularly when such a force
might be assigned to missions (domestic or foreign) in which
their representativeness would create an issue- And some
have even suggested that an increasingly black force has
adversely influenced the caliber of white recruits. These
critics indicate that a representative force is very
critical.
This study examines the socioeconomic characteristics of
Army personnel who enlisted during the period beginning July
1, 1S70 and ending September 30, 1984. The purpose of this
examinations is to determine if there were any apparent
3 See appendix A 'Military Environment and Socioeconomic
Overview or the EOK'
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trends in the socioeconomic characteristics of recruits
during that period. Also, the characteristics of those
people who enlisted in 1982 were compared to the U.S. jcpu-
iation of 1982 for socioeconomic representativeness.
Cooper says that socioeconomic representativeness is one
of the major equity issues in manpower procurement and
equality of opportunity is an increasing social concern.
£Bef. 4]. It would he undesirable to have the military
composed of persons from only one region of the country or
one racial group.
In March 1975 Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway
described the Army's manpower recruitment goals, taking the
issue of 'representation* to its idealistic extreme:
"What we seek, and need, are quality soldiers -men and
women- who are representative of the overall population.
Ideally, we would like to have at least one person from
every clock in every city, one from every rural delivery
route, and one from every street in every small town. C-ur
obligation to the American people is to strive to field an
Army which is both representative of them and acceptable
to then.
What the nation needs, Callaway explained, is an Army
broadly representative of all Americans which, to the
greatest extent possible, would contain roughly the same
percentages at various income levels and educational
levels." £Ref. 5]
This says that "guality personnel" should be representa-
tive of all regional, economic, and racial segments of
society. Also, this discussion has aspects of both equity
and responsibility based on the notion that it is every
citizen's right and obligation to aid in the defense of his
(or her) country.
Additionally, military effectiveness also enters the
argument. Military effectiveness is an elusive concept.
Mcskcs insists that there is a relationship tetween
socioeconomic background and soldierly performance. He says
that combat effectiveness, productivity, and low discipline
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rates show a positive correlation with socioeconomic vari-
ables, particularly education. [Ref. 6]
In this respect, the Military Manpower Task Force (MMTF)
concluded that socioeconomic factors such as "race or
ethnicity should not be factors in personnel decisions in
the military services and service members should be judged
on the basis of their gualications and performance as indi-
viduals, not as members of social or ethnic groups."
[Ref. 7] However, Military effectiveness can be examined.
as "individual capabilities, group performance, and the
perceptions of foreign countries". [Ref. 8].
Therefore, the importance of group relationships cannot
be overlooked in discussing military effectiveness. Moskos
contends that the most important things under combat situ-
ations are the social composition effect and the chemistry
of unit cohesion which reguires a blend of talents and tack-
grounds among members. [Ref. 9]. This by no means indi-
cates that being middle class will make an outstanding
military, but it implies that all socioeconomic classes
should participate in the military for the benefit of the
nation.
One research confirms the observations of commanders and
NCOs who remember the draft period; middle class and
upwardly mobile youth helped enrich the skill level and
commitment of military units in peace as well as in war.
[Ref. 10].
Seme believe that racial tensions adversely affect unit
cohesion. The reason would be that "unit cohesion is the
degree to which the members of a group or unit feel an
attraction to that group, and want to continue to belong
it". [Ref. 11]- The unit cohesion among members in the
peacetime force are very important to a future combat situ-
ation. This is reguired more in the Army than in other
services under combat. Gabriel and Savage state that the
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basic failure in Vietnam was because of a lack of unit cohe-
sion. £Bef. 12]. Therefore, the policy of social represen-
tativeness is vitally important to an American military.
The purpose of this study was twofold. First was the
study of the socioeccnomic characteristics of Army enlistees
over a 14-year period to determine if any trends existed.
Second was a comparison between the civilian society in 1982
and the Army's accessions in 1982 to test for social repre-
sentativeness. 4
Chapter II describes the history of social representa-
tiveness and recruiting in the American military. Also,
this chapter examines the progress of the AVF over the ten
years period since its inception?
Chapter III describes the data and variables used in
this study. Also in this chapter is a description of the
methodology used to process the data.
Chapter IV reports trends in the socioeconomic charac-
teristics cf Army recruits from 1970 to 1984. The socioeco-
nomic characteristics studied include geographic region,
race, sex, education, mental aptitude, family income, age
and marital status. Ihis was done to determine if the
composition of those volunteering for Army service had
changed over the fifteen years (1970-1984) studied.
Chapter V examines the social representativeness of the
Army enlistees in 1982. The variables used to make the
comparison with civilian society were geographic region,
race, sex, education, and family income.
Chapter VI provides a summary and conclusions in light
of the present research.




A. HISTCBI OF REPRESENTATIVENESS AND RECRUITING
1- Bevolii tionary War
Representativeness in the U.S. military has teen a
long standing tradition modeled in the Anglo-Saxon concept,
under which every free man between the ages of sixteen and
sixty was obligated tc respond, fully equipped, to any call
to arms. £Ref. 13].
Prior to the Eevolution, the original militias of
colonial America every available man—white or black,
freedman or slave— was to help defend the domestic order
against Indian uprisings, European transgressors and other
threats to peace. [ Ref . 14]. This concept of citizen
militia—the idea that to be a citizen was to have the obli-
gation tc bear arms in the defense of the nation— became the
standard of American nilitary tradition. 3ut, as the colo-
nies became secure and Indian threats faded, the need fcr
the miJitia diminished and the system deteriorated through
deferments and exemptions. [Ref. 15]. Therefore, partici-
pation in the militia became voluntary and the units became
increasingly social in nature.
In addition, the colonies developed a policy of
excluding blacks from military service, because of the fear
that free black militiamen might support insurrections and a
related apprehension about training slaves in the use cf
arms. [ Eef . 16 ].
Luring the Revolutionary War, all states resorted to
conscription. Since the Articles of Confederation stressed
freedcm from central authority, Congress was helpless in
rectifying the inequities. It lacked the power to draft;
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it lacked money to pay enlistment and bounties equal to
those the states could offer; and it could not enforce
equity under state draft laws. [Ref. 17]. The unequal
burden persisted, as draft laws frequently allowed a man to
hire a substitute or pay a fine to avoid conscription.
At the end of the war, Washington conveyed to
congress his "Sentiments on a Peacetime Establishment." In
recommending a small peacetime army backed by a well-
regulated, federally provided, National Militia, he wrote of
a universal military obligation:
It may te laid down as a primary position, and the basis
of cur system that every citizen who enjoys the protection
of a free Government, owes not only a pre-portion of his
property, but even of his personal services to the defense
of it, and consequently that the citizens of America (
with a few legal and official exceptions ) from 18 to 50
years of age should be borne on the Militia Rolls,
provided with uniform Arms, and (be) so far accustomed to
the use of them, that the total strength of the country
might be called forth at a short notice on any very inter-
esting emergency. [Ref. 18].
President Washington also suggested a plan whereby
each 19-year-old male would train several weeks for three
summers. He felt this system would be beneficial to the
country because trained men would be ready to supplement the
regular Army, if the need arose. The first Secretary of
War, Henry Knox, later submitted a plan that would reorg-
anize the militia under federal control to augment the
existing seven-hundred-man U.S Army. Both plans comtined
the idea of a citizen's right to bear arms and the concept
of universal service. However, neither of these plans were
approved by the congress. "The idea of universal service
was accepted in theory but was never implemented."
[Ref. 19 ]. The states were against universal service and a
large standing army or a reserve militia controlled hy the
"Federal government as possible interference in individual
states rights. Additionally, the cost of maintaining a
force of this type was considered enormous. The dominant
view was that standing armies in peace were not in keeping
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with the republican fcrm of government. For these reasons,
the states would provide the necessary manpower in the form
of their militias when it was needed until the next war.
£Ref. 20].
2 - IhS. Civil War
The Civil War was the first total war in which
millions of participants, the economies of each enemy, and
finally, their respective cultures were fuel for the
inferno. £Ref. 21].
With the onset of the Civil War, volunteers flooded
both the Armies of the North and South. The Federal govern-
ment, facing the same reduction in the number of volunteers,
enacted the Militia Act in 1862. It required states to
furnish men through enlistments or draft if necessary. This
system proved to be too unwieldy for the states to control
effectively, so it was replaced on March 3, 1863 by the
enrollment Act. This was the first draft law of the United
States. £Hef. 22]
However, under this law, any prospective conscript
was allowed the opportunity to buy temporary exemption from
the Army for the sum of $ 300, or he could be permanently
exempt if he hired a substitute to fight in his place.
These exemptions brought about inequities in favor of the
rich, which were partly responsible for subsequent bloody
riots and violence. [Hef. 23]
The obvious injustice was dramatically emphasized
when citizens and draft officials clashed in July 1863 in
what was later known as the "draft riots of New York." For
four days an antidraft mob controlled much of New York City,
burning and looting anti-slavery and black property. Less
of life has been estimated as high as 1,200 persons and
property damage may have reached two million dollars. Also,
this law had a more immediate effect on blacks, as above
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mentioned, but it made the participation of blacks in the
Civil War according to President Lincoln. During the Civil
War, 390,000 blacks served in the military and 38,000 black
soldiers died. [Ref. 24]
After the Civil War, the draft was an intense polit-
ical issue tecause of inequities. The draft was never a
great source of manpower for the North during the Civil War.
Volunteers fought the war. "Only 46,000 actual
inductees— 2.3 percent of the military manpower raised
during the war— were recruited from the 250,000 draft
notices issued in the North." [Ref. 25], The concept of
the citizen-soldier was put into practice. For all the
shortcomings of the methods of manpower procurement used,
the Civil War experience demonstrated that essentially
voluntary recruitment methods could be used, even during
times when large forces were needed and in the face of
adverse circumstances. [Ref. 26].
3. World War I
Conscription was dropped after the Civil War, net to
be the revived again until 1917, the year the United states
entered World War I. Widely attacked as unconstitu-
tional, the Selective Service Act of 1917 established a broad
system of a local Selective Service Boards. The act estab-
lished the machinery to conduct the draft. The legislation
provided for classification of male registrants "into one of
five categories according to their 'value' to the civil
sector." Class I contained these men of least value,
therety allowing them to be inducted first. [Ref. 27].
"This, of course, led to an overrepresentation of
the peer an., black, as illustrated by the fact that Hacks
constituted 9.6 percent of all registrants but accounted for
13 percent of the inductions." £Ref. 28]. The legislation
also provided for exemptions to certain categories of
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conscientious objectors and certain hardship cases. This
discrimination resulted in some grumbling, but overall there
were relatively few complaints about fairness. It would te
that "many blacks pinned their hopes for a better future en
involvement in the war and many black leaders hoped to use
the Army as a vehicle for social change." [Eef. 29].
"During the course of florid War I, two-thirds {about
3,000,000 men) of the American armed forces were
conscripts." [Ref. 30]. Conscription thus became the
basis, for all enlisted manpower procurement in 1917,
since enlistments were halted so as not to disturb the
orderly working of the Selective Service System. This
element of the law invoked debate over the autocratic nature
of conscription. Soiie felt that volunteerism had not teen
given a proper chance and that the law was an insult to
American manhood. It was argued in Congress, that if proper
cash inducements were made, sufficient numbers of young men
would enlist for the duration of the war out of practical
and patriotic consideration. [Ref. 31]
Nevertheless, the whole operation of drafting an
Army for World War I went smoothly. Perhaps much of this
success can be attributed to General Oake's report 5 which
had served as the basis for the drafting of the Selective
Service Act. Of his recommendations incorporated into the
1917 Act, the most important was:
"We muEt depend in every time of national peril not on a
standing armv nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a
citizenry trained and accustomed to arms... a system by
which training may be made familiar with the use of modern
arms." [Ref. 32]
Again, the citizen-soldier concept emerges as theo-
retical policy in America. However, for the first time,
volunteerism was considered not practical in meeting mili-
tary manpower requirements. [Ref. 33] At the end of World
5 This report is called as 'Report on the Draft in
Illinois, 1865'
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War I, the draft was allowed to lapse. Congress considered
universal military training (DMT) , but popular support had
clearly peaked just prior to the War- The National Defense
Act of 1920 reaffirmed America's peacetime reliance on
voluntary recruitment. DMT went back into the "political
closet" for another two decades. [Bef. 34]
4 - florid war II
Cn September 16, 1940, Congress passed the Selective
Service Training Act, the first peacetime draft in the
nation's history. Contrary to the practice of florid War I,
conscription was used to supplement volunteer enlistments.
Also, modeled after the World War I plan, the question of
compulsory service again brought about debate on the ques-
tion cf its constitutionality. Those opposing the draft
advocated citizen's right, while the supporters defended the
position that the draft was the only equitable way to ensure
a strong standing military force in which all eligible men
would serve. [Eef. 35]
However, this law by the Roosevelt administration
reflected 'equality of service' in blacks as the following
main points: " (1) The population of blacks in the Army would
be equivalent to the proportion of blacks in the general
population; (2) Black units would be established in each
branch cf the Army; (3) Blacks would be allowed to attend
officer candidate schcols so they could serve as pilots in
black aviation units. Yet, the statements policy also noted
that, for the maintenance of troop morale and defense prepa-
rations, the War Department would continue not to inter-
mingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same
regimental organiza ticns". [Eef. 36]
In 1941, fully a year after World War II began in
Europe, Congress approved a Selective Service Draft
Initially, those inducted were required to serve for a
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period of one year. However, following the attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7 , 1941, just as the sentiment of
conscription changed so did the length of compulsory
service. The period cf service now was for the duration of
the war plus six months. [Bef. 37]
Before the end of the war, all males between the
ages cf 18 and 65 were required to register and the
Selective Service Board controlled the entire military
procurement procedure. Although it rarely met its monthly
quota, the draft nevertheless provided some 10 million of
the nearly 15 million Americans who served in World War II.
It should be noted, however, there were close to 45 million
registrants. "In Augcst 1945, the Japanese surrendered. The
draft continued for 18 months after the War had ended and
was allowed to lapse in March 1947. However this lapse was
to be just that, a brief pause in the 25 years of uninter-
rupted ccnscription tc follow." [Bef. 38]
5. Eost-World War II
In 1948, with the 0. S military commitments
increasing and the size the military declining, President
Truman requested congress to reinstitute the draft for the
second time in the history of the U.S during a time of
peace. In 1951, as the war entered its second year,
Congress passed the universal Military Training and Service
Act, which established the Selective Service System as a
permanent agency and made all males between the ages of 18
1/2 and 25 eligible for induction. The Universal Military
Trainirg and Service Acts of 1951, 1959, 1963 and 1967
continued the practice of conscription. [Bef. 39]
With each new enactment of the law, the Selective
Services* role was changed. Additional deferments were
granted to students and various occupations. These policies
greatly broadened the scope of the draft and greatly altered
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its scope- "The Directer (General Hershey) has pointed out
that cne reason the nation's shortage of scientists, engi-
neers, and technicians in the late 1950' s was not 40,000 to
50,000 greater was the system's student dependent policies
of earlier years, particularly during the Korean War."
[Ref. 40]
As Davis and Eolbeare have commented, "at no time
has the practice of ccnscription in this country been
anything but selective." [Eef. 41].
Ihere have always been exemptions and deferments for
men in seme occupations or officials whose services are
deemed more valuable at home. This is discriminatory in
nature, in that by virtue of economic and social position
exemptions from military service are obtainable to seme.
In 1963 there were "74,000 inductions" which consti-
tuted enly 20% of the male non- prior service (NPS) acces-
sions. With the increase of the United States involvement
in Vietnam, draft calls rose sharply (to a level of
"103,000" in 1965) and much attention was focussed on the
draft. [Ref. 42].
Curing the Vietnam war, many magazines reported
official Department of Defense statistics showing that
"blacks were more likely to (1) be drafted, (2) serve in
high-risk combat units, and cocseguently
, (4) be killed or
wounded in battle." Eetween 1961 and 1966, "when blacks
composed approximately 11 percent of the general population
aged nineteen to twenty-one, black casualties amounted to
almost cne -fourth of all losses of Army enlisted personnel
in Vietnam." [Eef. 43]
These mounting criticisms led to major change in the
Selective Service System policies. The new Military
Selective Service Act of 1967 contained certain reforms;
mainly in the order of selection, which was reversed to take
19-year-clds and ex-college students first. Deferment
criteria were also tightened. [Ref. 44]
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In 1968 General lewis Hershey, Director of the
Selective Service System, asserted that "the System is
representative of the American people, as clear an example
as exists today of government cf the people, by the people,
and for the people.. ..The System as constituted invades all
economic levels, all educational institutions, all ethnic
groups." £Hef. 45]
However, inspite of his responding to critics, "an
array of deferments and disqualifications for getting
married, having a child, enrolling in college, teaching in
public school, joining the Peace Corps, or failing the
induction physical examination—left numerous ways for young
men to avoid the draft, and those who did, it appeared, were
mainly the white, better—educated children of comfortable
families." £Ref. 46].
In 1972, President Nixon proposed elimination cf the
peacetime draft, and in 1973 the Selective Service law
lapsed giving way to a professional, All-Volunteer Force.
During the transition to A7F, the major concern was
"quantity and quality, and the issue of representativeness
was secondary". £Eef. 47]. The reason is that the armed
forces would first have to attract an adequate number of
qualified volunteers.
Cn the other hand, on a small scale the same cppor-
tunity is now being offered to women. Beginning with World
Mar II, when women were first given full military status,
they have been an important part of the military. In 1967,
the restrictions that limited their numbers to two percent
of the military were removed. In 1972, when the decision
was made to increase the population of women in the mili-
tary, "some 45,000 women constituted 1.9 % of all activity-
duty military personnel; of these women, the vast majority
(91%) held traditionally female jobs, such as medical and
dental specialists or clerical workers." [Bef. 48].
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However, the women recruits of the Army constituted about
12-14 percent of total Army recruits since 1978. Most of
them were assigned tc nontraditional jobs. Thus, women can
increasingly exercise their right and obligation to defend
their cation.
B. PBOGBESS OF AVF
Since the end of draft system in 1973, a lot of contro-
versial issues on AVF has occured as Martin Binkin observed:
"With the decision to abolish military conscription in 1973,
the United states took on a monumental task: raising an
armed force of 3 million by strictly voluntary means. A key
concern was whether the services could enlist enough young
men and women without incurring additional costs and without
comprcmising the quality and therefore the effectiveness of
the armed forces." £Bef. 49].
But, in view of its experience, the AVF does not provide
a clear-cut answer, as the issues continue to be widely
debated. It is clear that there have been some significant
problems.
The purpose here is to pinpoint the critical problems on
the progress of the Q.S.A's volunteer system in the first
decade following the end of conscription
1 . Manning the Active Force
In 1973, when the conscription system ended, the
total number of active-duty personnel in the American Army
was just over 810 thousand. Since then, the size of the
active Army decreased continuously before reaching the
lowest level in 1979 with 759 thousand. [ Ref . 50]
At the same time, retention rates of experienced,
mid-carreer enlisted leaders and technicians, who are the
heart of an effective Army force, declined year by year.
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These situations were caused by the coincidence of
two sets of factors: "First, compensation for military
personnel was allowed to become less competitive. Caps on
military pay were imposed in several years, funds for
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses were reduced, the GI
Bill was terminated for new entrants to the force, and
recruiting manpower and funds were cut. Second, unemploy-
ment rates in the civilian sector declined, creating attra-
tive alternative job opportunities for both potential
recruits and experienced members of the force." [Bef. 51]
2- Eecrui t Quality
Educational level and aptitude test scores are
regarded two of the armed forces* most important standards
for enlistment.
a. Educational level
Enlisted volunteers entering the armed forces,
compared to recruits during the draft era, have teen more
likely to have a high school diploma than to have some
college credits: "In the 1960s, about 25 percent of Army
nonprior-service enlisted accessions had some college gradu-
ates. As a result of the 1970 changes in draft policy, the
percentage of enlistees with college training started to
drop. Today, less than 5 percent have some college. Less
than 1 percent have degrees. To put these numbers in
perspective: In the early 1960s, the army had at any given
time 20 to 30 thousand college graduates in its enlisted
ranks, and over 100 thousand enlistees with some college.
That pool of older, better-educated youth was a great asset
and stands in stark contrast to the low numbers of enlistees
today who have a college background. Indeed, today the
interest focuses on hew many enlistees are high-school grad-
uates, net on how many are college graduates. Ironically,
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the Army today is much more demanding in its technical and
managerial chores. These trends would have occurred even if
peacetime conscription had been continued." [Ref. 52].
Another concern has been focused on the racial
comparisons in educational level: "The proportion of black
recruits in fiscal 1S81 with a high school diploma exceeded
the comparable proportion of white recruits by a substantial
margin. This trend has attracted some attention since it is
well known that the education levels of American blacks
trail behind those of their white counterparts. While the
gap has narrowed in recent years, blacks* educational attain-
ment is still markedly lower than that of whites. "In point
of fact," notes One observer, "today's Army enlisted ranks
is the only major arena in American society where black
educational levels surpass those of whites and by a signifi-
cant degree." [Ref. 53]
Women, in the meantime, made a large contribu-
tion to overall quality in the Army: "Between 1981 and 1983
women made up 13 percent of Army recruits and accounted for
15 percent of the high school diplomas. Overall, the impact
of women on the educational profile of military recruits has
been telling: in the decade following the end of the draft,
92 percent of all women who enlisted in the Army had
completed high school, compared with just under 62 percent
of the men. Had the Array not expanded the opportunities for
women soldiers, it is doubtful if the all- volunteer force
could have survived the 1970s." £Ref. 54]
h. Aptitude level
Mental aptitude in military plays an important
part in the personnel screening, classification, training,
and assignment. The services especially use aptitude scores
as the principal predictors of trainability.
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However, this aptitude test has been disputed in
the Army: " For the first several years, the armed services
attracted roughly the same proportion of high-
aptitude (category I and II) recruits as they had during the
draft years, but a substantially larger proportion of those
with average aptitude and, commensurately, a smaller
percentage of those in the lowest category, the latter part
of the 1970s, however, proved to be a difficult time as the
effectiveness of the armed forces in general and the guality
of their members in particular came under question; in
1977-80, 44 percent cf new recruits were in category IV.
The Army was the most seriously affected; close to half of
all its male recruits scored in the bottom category."
[Hef. 55]
In addition to this, another confusing problem
has been occurred in regards to entry test results: "With
the introduction of a new version of the standardized entry
test in 1976, errors in converting raw test scores into
percentile scores caused the latter to be overstated, with
the result that many recruits who would otherwise have teen
ineligible were accepted by the military services. The
magnitude of the error was substantial; for example, in
contrast to the original belief that only 5 percent cf the
recruits who entered the armed forces in fiscal 1979 had
scored in category IV, corrected scores placed 30 percent in
that category. The Amy was the most seriously affected-
close to half its recruits were below average rather than 9
percent, as reported originally." [ Eef - 56]
3 . The Mobilization probl em
To bring the full national power to bear in a major
war, the Active Force must be rapidly reinforced by units cf
the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) .
The main manpower problem of the Selected Reserve in the
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mid-1970s was the loss of strength in the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve. Also, "there is currently a serious
shortage of manpower in the Army IRE, which had topped 1.2
million in 1973, was half that size by 1975. The shortfall
will re reduced to seme extent by 1988, but there will still
be a shortage of about 240,000 enlisted soldiers with
combat-related skills who would be required to replace
wartime casualties in the event of a major war that tegins
with little warning." [Ref. 57]
Regardless of the importance of the reserves, this
problem was not emphasized on the grounds that "A conven-
tional war would not last long enough for the reserves to
matter anyway. The "short war" school of thought contended
that a future conventional conflict would be measured in
terms of days or weeks, rather than months or years, ending
early in either negotiations or escalation to nuclear war.
In 1978 a test of the nation's mobilization capabilities
revealed that, should the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
square off in a replay of World War II, the Army would soon
run short of combat troops. Accordingly, mobilization capa-
bilities received more attention, and concerns about the
reserve forces were taken more seriously." [Ref. 58]
4. Social Composition
The most persistent concerns about the all-volunteer
force has been its failure to attract a representativeness
of the population. Per example, in 1982, the proportion of
blacks in the enlisted force was 33 percent in the Army,
while the population as a whole was 12 percent black. This
high black content of the force has come about a result of
the opportunities they have found in the military services.
[Ref. 59]
Cne of the irteresting changes in the structure of
the enlisted ranks is that the percentage of blacks in the
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higher grades has been increased: "Between 1964 and 1980,
the percentage of blacks in grade E9 increased from 3.3
percent to 19 percent. For grade E7, for the same period,
the increase was fron 7.9 percent to 25.2 percent. Given
that blacks will have authority over whites to a significant
degree within the enlisted grades, we must ask to what
extent issues of reverse discrimination will evolve. Onlike
the civilian sector, where the concept refers to majority
members discriminating against other majority members en
behalf of a minority, in military institutions blacks have
significant authority over whites." [Ref. 60]
But on the other hand, "the proportion of black
officers in the armed forces remained out of balance despite
a more than twofold increase over the period, from 2.3
percent in 1972 to just over 5 percent in 1981." [Bef. 61]
Cne school of thought held by some such as Morris
Janowitz has expressed concern that "A military not troadly
representative of society would foster its own rigid ethos
and weaken civilian ccntrol; this group fears that a
"professional" rather than a "citizen" army would become
isolated from community values and less concerned about the
ethics cf its own use." Representative Paul Simon, Democrat
of Illinois observed, "We are relying excessively on the
poor cf this country, When blood is shed in Grenada or
lebancn or anywhere else, it is the poor of the country
whose blcod is shed. There are no sons of members of
Congress or members cf the Cabinet in Grenada or Lebancn."
[Ref. 62]
The trends which are the consequences of this occu-
pational military manpower policy may be seen in the first-
term enlisted ranks: "Within the first-term enlisted ranks
the effects of the occupational trends are manifested in the
changing social composition of recruits, the high level of
attrition, the erosicn of barracks life, the high incidence
2S
of moonlighting, and in the widespread attitudes of aliena-
tion and disaffection." £Ref- 63]
5- .S^it Cohesio n
The Pentagon has implemented stronger occupational
policies for the volunteer system, thus the cohesiveness
that is essential to an effective fighting force become
weaker: "The emphasis on occupational policies that accompa-
nied the end of conscription, according to a leading critic,
has redefined military service in terms of the economic
marketplace. One of the principal casualties has teen the
traditional military lifestyle, the centerpiece of which was
barracks life. In an earlier era, when cash pay was lew,
most junior people were single and ate at the mess hall and
lived with their unit on post. Today, however, many volun-
teers, with higher levels of disposable income, are often
married and choose tc eat and to live on the civilian
economy. This change, so the argument goes, has undermined
unit camaraderie and has diminished military effectiveness."
£Eef. 64] Teenagers will become more rational and more
selfish. Nobody expects that money will attract many young
men to enlist if they think they will soon be shot.
Briefly speaking, under those circumstances, it
becomes doubtful that in time of viar those young men who
are produced in complicated problems could fight against
Soviet military capability that now exceeds that of 1970s.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA BASE
The data used in this analysis were furnished by the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) , located in Monterey,
California. DMDC maintains and stores many kinds of
manpower data files. This DMDC cohort file furnished the
cohort data needed for analysis.
The file contains the information on Army enlistees at
the time of their enlistment as well as approximately 75
elements of personal data. For purposes of this study, only
ten elements were used: District, Educational level. Sex,
Race, Marital status, Mental aptitude. Enlist year, ZIP
code, and Family inccme. Among these elements family income
was obtained from the Census Bureau through DMDC. Tc
examine family income, the approximately 33,600 zipcodes of
population were used-
The population studied here consists of non-prior and
prior service accessions entering active service from the
year 1970 to 1984, when it included both the draft system
(1970-72) and the Volunteer system (1973-84).
The data files were based on calendar year instead cf
the fiscal year. The reason is that until 1977 the fiscal
year began on July first, but since then the beginning of
the fiscal year was changed to October first. Table 1 shows
the population of each entering cohort.
Seme of the elements were further defined. For example,
Home states, the enlistee's home of record at time of entry,
was divided into five Districts. The five Districts are
Northeast, North Central, South, ^est, and Other. The










































Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center, April 1985,
This classificaticn of Districts is almost identical to
the four Census regicrs which are classified, Northeast,
North Central, South, Mest. So, the classification of
Districts in Chapter "V were used in the same way with Census
regions.
The errors of each elements were classified as
'unknown*, or ignored, because it did not affect the total
percentiles. This type of errors were regarded as errors
occurred in transcribing, recording, coding, and processing
the data.
B. DATA HAHIPOLATIOB
Analysis of the available information was conducted
through the use of frequency distributions of cases within
conticgercy tables. This was accomplished with the use of
the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) , an integrated
computer system for data analysis.
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TABLE 2








New Hampshire, New York, Maine,
Vermont, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Rhode Island
Kansas / North Dakota, South Dakota,Nebraska, Missouri, "Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana
Virginia, West Virginia, Florida,
North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Delaware, Mississippi,
Maryland, Arkansas, Louisiana,
District of Columbia. Tennessee,
Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Texas
Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado. Montana,
New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada,
Alaska, Washington, California
Hawaii, Cregon
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, Canal Zone
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Data Center, April 1985.
SAS contains procedures for selecting variables and
rearranging variables as well as the usual descriptive
statistics, simple frequency distributions, and
cross tabulations.
The crosstabulaticn is a joint frequency distribution cf
events according to two or more classification variables.
It is used to examine the comparison between the classified
elements. This SAS program also provides a simple technique
for examining the means and standard deviation of dependent
variables among various subgroups in a sample or total popu-
lation. All of these procedures were used to process the
data for this study.
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For assisting in interpretation and presentation of the
results, some of the elements were recategorized into larger
sets. The element, race, originally consisted of three
groups; white, black, and other. The "other" category
includes Oriental and Polynesian races. Since the "other"
and the "black" category both represent minority races, race
was recategorized intc white and nonwhite categories. So,
these came to represent majority and minority groups.
Educational level is the highest grade completed. This
was rearranged in twc ways. The first method was to clas-
sify each grade into broad groups of education as can be
seen in Table 3.
TABLE 3
The Classification of Education
Classification Highest year of Education
1. Non-high school 1-7 years, 8 years, 1 year
graduate high school, 2 year high school,
3-4 year high school (No diploma)
2. GED equivalence High school G.E.
D
3. High school
graduate High school diploma
4. Some college
or higher 1,2-3-4 years college (No diploma)
College graduate, Masters and
Docters or equivalent
The second method was to classify the groups as nonhigh
school graduates and high school graduates. Non-high school
graduates are those who did net complete high school,
including GED equivalence. High school graduates are those
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who completed the twelfth grade and received a diploma
(including those who went on to college)
The mental aptitude variable is the enlistee* s mental
group classification based on scores on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT). AFQT scores are used to determine
eligibility to enlist and assignment to occupations. AFQT
scores provide a useful measure of trainability. Enlisted
personnel with higher test scores tend to be assigned to the
more complex jobs. A mental group is based on AFQT percen-
tiles. The mental groups and the AFQT percentile ranges are
shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
U.S. Armed Forces Qualification Test Scores
by Categories
(AFQT)
AFQT Group AFQT Percentiles
I 99 - 93
IT 92 - 65
IIIA 64 - 50
IIIB 49-31
IVA 30 - 21
I7B 20-16
IVC 15 - 10
V 09 - 01
Source: Department of Defense
These variables were recategorized into two groups: I
through Ilia and lilt through 7 (the upper and lower halves
of the AFQT percentiles) . The reason is that an AFQT
percentile score of 50 is average for the population.
The family income element of enlistees was estimated ty
matching enlistees* zipcodes to the population's zipcode
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area. In order to simplify the complicated variables,
family income was recorded into 10 groups which have inter-
vals by $5000 income. The coded values and the range cf
family income can be seen in Table 5.
TABLE 5
The Coded values and The Range of Family Income










10 50000 and above
A weighted average was obtained by summing the products
of the ceded value and the number of cases within that
respective interval and dividing this sum by total enlistees
within district. This methodology was used to produce the
mean value of the fanily income variable. This method and
data receding were used to generate the tables and figures
presented in Chapter IV.
Also, with grouped data it isn't possible to determine
the median exactly, because the actual data values have been
lost in the process of grouping. It is possible to approxi-
mate the median on the assumption that the actual data
values are evenly spread over the class interval. The
approximation formula is
Median = I W/Fm*{.5 N - CFb)
where L= lower limit of the interval containing the median
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W= width of that interval
Fm=freguency in that interval
CFb=cumulative frequency (total count) below that
interval
N=total number of values This methodology was used to
calculate the median value of the family income variable in
Chapter v.
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IV. SOCIOECONO MIC CHARACTERISTICS
With the SAS program, it was possible to process a great
number of data of each year for the analysis of socioeco-
nomic characteristics of Army enlistees in the period cf
1970 through 1984. Comparisons among years, district, and
race were mainly used to identify the changes and trends in
the variables. Unless otherwise explained. Army enlisted
accessions of all types and sources are included in the
data.
A. GEOGRAPHIC
First of all, the home area was studied to determine the
geographic representativeness of Army enlistees. This
provide a good measure of how the social composition of the
force has varied over time. In other words, "to the extent
that individuals 1 attitudes, mores, and behavior are shaped
by their environment, then measures that reflect the envi-
ronmental background cf enlisted accessions are important
descriptors of social composition." [Ref. 57]. As
described in Chapter III, the regions were divided into five
districts corresponding with the DMDC classification. The
percentage of enlistees from each district for each year is
shown in Table 6.
The enlistees coming from the south have occupied the
largest portion (3 4. 9-42. 5%) of percentage, followed by the
north central (22.0-30.1%), the north east ( 14. 3- 1 9. 97c) , the
west (15.5-19.3%), and the other (0.6-2.8%). The most
dramatic change was the percentage of both the north central
(8.17) and south (7.67) during that period. The beginning




Percentage Distribution of Army Accessions t1970- 84 by District
Enlist North- Horth South West Other Total
year East Centra1
1S70 16.5 29.2 36.2 17.6 0.6 1C0.0
1971 15.4 30.1 34.7 18.6 1.2 100.0
1S72 15.9 27.1 37.6 17.9 1.4 100.0
1S73 14.3 22.0 42.6 19.3 1.8 100.0
1974 15.9 23.1 39.7 19.4 1.9 100.0
1975 18.8 25.5 35.0 19.2 1.5 100.0
1976 19.9 25.9 35. 1 17.4 1.7 100.0
1977 20.0 24.9 37.4 15.7 2.0 100.
1978 17.4 22.6 41.4 15.7 2.8 1C0.0
1979 17.7 24.1 39.8 15.7 2.7 100.0
1980 18.1 26.0 37. 1 16.6 2.2 1C0.0
1981 17.3 27.6 37.2 15.6 2.4 100.0
1982 17.6 28.6 35.0 16. 1 2.7 1C0.0
1983 17.4 29.2 35.4 16.5 1.5 100.0
1984 16.4 29. 1 36.4 16.5 1.5 100.0
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
. .
Manpower Eata Center.
indicates that the south and north central has remained
relatively stable at a high rate. The increase has teen
made by the north east (approximately 2%) and the other
(approximately 0.4-1.4%). The west only decreased (approxi-
mately 2-3%) during that period.
B. BACE
Next, the racial composition of the enlistees was deter-
mined for each year. The two groups were white and nonwhite
(black and all other races) . This was done to place all
minority races into one category to determine their repre-
sentation in the Army. As Coorer observed, "The descriptor
most freguently thought of in terms of social representation
is the racial composition of the Armed Forces. Few subjects
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have generated as much interest or as much concern as the
rising proportion of blacks in the enlisted ranks. This is
viewed by many as evidence that the volunteer force has not,
or cannot, draw from the middle and upper socioeconomic
segments of American society." £Bef- 58]
Table 7 shows the percentage of non-white Army recruits
ty year.
TABLE 7
Nonwhite Accessions as a Percent of All
Army Accessions, 1970-84
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Ncnwhite
(%) 13.9 15.4 19.5 27.4 27.3 23.2 29.7 33.3
Enlist
Year 1978 1S79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Ncnwhite
(9t) 38.0 39.7 34.0 31.3 28.0 25.7 27.2
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower lata Center.
There was a big difference between the draft years
(1970-1972), and the period of all-volanteer service
(1973-1984). The average was 16.3% and 30.47o, respectively.
Daring the volunteer years (1973-1984), the percentage fluc-
tuated very widely (23-255-39 .75?) . Especially 1978 and 1979
the periods recorded with high rates. The only year which
did r.ct show a high rate was the year 1975. From 1973 to
1979, there was the trend of increase and then decrease
yearly.
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Tc further examine the racial composition and regional
representation, the percentage of recruits of white grcup
and non-white group was computed. These figures are shown
in Tahle 8.
TABU 8
Army Accessions ty Bace, Begion, and Year, 1970-84
Enlist North- North South West Other
year East Central
White
1970 87.5 91.0 77.5 94.2 91.2
1971 84.9 89.7 75.9 92.2 87. 1
1972 83.0 89.3 68.3 90.9 87.9
1973 79.3 86.7 55.9 87.4 85. 1
1974 77.4 84.5 56.9 86,8 75. 9
1975 79.5 85.4 63.9 86.4 76.7
1976 72.5 80.5 55. 1 83.2 75.6
1977 71-5 79.3 49.9 79.6 76.4
1978 70.2 76.7 43.5 77.2 81.2
1979 63.2 74.4 44.3 75.0 83.0
1980 65.4 78.2 52.6 76.2 76.6
1981 70.1 79.5 55.0 78.7 81.6
1982 71.8 81.4 60.5 79.7 79.4
1983 74.0 82.9 64.3 81.0 77.4
1984 74.1 81.6
Nonwhite
62.8 78.3 70. 1
1970 12.5 9.0 22.5 5.8 8.8
1971 15.1 10.3 24.2 7.8 12.9
1972 17.0 10.7 31.7 9.1 12. 1
1973 20.7 13.3 44. 1 12.6 14.9
1974 22.6 15.5 43. 1 13.2 24. 1
1975 20.5 14.7 36.1 13.6 23.4
1976 27.5 19.6 44.9 16.8 24.4
1977 28.5 20.7 50. 1 20.4 23.6 •
1978 29.8 23.3 56.5 22.8 18.8
1979 36.8 25.6 55.7 25.0 17.0
1980 34.6 21.8 47.4 23.8 23.4
1981 29.9 20.5 45.0 21.3 18.4
1982 28.2 18.6 39.5 20.3 20.6
1983 26.0 17.2 35.7 19.0 22.6
1984 26.0 18.4 37.2 21.2 29.9
Source : Derived from data pirovided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
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Ihe trend for all districts was an increase in the non-
white recruits over all periods. The most dramatic change
occurred in the south, varying from a low of 22.47% to a
high cf 56.52%. On the other hand, the percentage of white
enlistees entering tie Army for all districts decreased over
that period. The most dramatic decrease occurred in the
west, dropping from 94.19% to 78.83%.
Table 9 displays the percentages of Army accessions in
non-white groups that came from each district over that
period.
TABU 9
Percentage Eistribution of Nonwhite Army
Accessions, 1970-84 by District
Enlist North- Kcrth South West Other Total
year East Certral
1970 14.8 18.7 58.3 7.3 0.'4 100.0
1971 15. 1 20.1 54.4 9.4 1.0 100.0
1972 14.7 14.9 61.1 8.4 0.9 100.0
1973 10.8 10.7 68.6 8.8 1.0 100.0
1974 13.2 13.1 62.5 9.4 1.7 100.0
1975 16.6 16.1 54.3 1 1.3 1.5 100.0
1976 18.5 17. 1 53.1 9.8 1.4 100.0
1977 17.1 15.5 56.3 9.6 1.4 100.0
1978 13.6 13.9 61.6 9.5 1.4 100.0
1979 16.3 16.7 55.8 9.9 1.1 100.0
1980 18.4 16.6 51.6 11.6 1.5 100.0
1981 16.4 18.0 53.4 10.6 1.4 130.0
1982 17.8 19.1 49.7 11.7 1.5 100.0
1983 17.6 19.5 49.2 12.2 1.3 100.0
1984 15.6 19.7 49.8 12.9 1.7 • 100.0
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
This revealed that over one-half of the non-white
recruits are from the south. These data show, however, a
downward trend in the percentage from the south, and an
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upward trend in the percentage from the west (7. 3%- 12. 9$)
and the ether (0.4%- 1.7%). The percentage of the northeast
and ncrth central has remained moderately constant over the
period. The largest fluctuation was the percent of the
nonwhites enlisting from the south, which ranged from a lew
of 49.2% in 1983 to a high of 68.6% in 1973.
C. SE2, AGE, HARITAI STATUS
female enlisted strength must become greater in numter
to meet the Army's goal of 70,000 enlisted women on active
duty fcy February 1987. Sex is also a indicators of social
composition. As James L. Lacy notes, "The male-only draft
derived much of its historical rationale from the fact that
nilitary service itself was almost exclusively a male
experience. Before 1S70, less than 1 percent of military
personnel were women. However, the AVF introduced new
facts. Women were actively recruited in the 1970s; ty 1980,
they accounted for 8 percent of the active-duty force."
[Ref. 59] Table 10 displays the percentage of women cf the
total recruited.
As can be seen in table 10, from 1970 to 1984, female
representation in the enlisted force grew from 4.1% to
12.1a. Until 1981 there has been a continual increase in
the number of women recruits. Since 1982 an upward trend is
shown. As noted by the Military Manpower Task Force, "This
increase has been consistent with the national emphasis on
improving opportunities for women in non-traditional occupa-
tional field." [Ref. 60].
If the women entering the Army are broken into white and
non-white groups, the increasing percentages of non-white
women can be found in the Table 11. Over the period, there
was a 69.1$ increase cf women recruits. However, the recent
records have remained moderately constant with the pretty
high rates (31 . 9SE-45- 2*) .
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TABLE 1C I
Female Accessions as a Percent of All Army
Accessions , 1970-84
Enlist
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Female
4.1 3.2 3.8 6.7 9.6 9.0 8.1 9.4
Enlist
Year 1978 1979 1980 1S81 1982 1983 1984
female
13.7 13.8 13.6 14.7 12.2 12.1 12.1
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
TABLE 11
Nonwhite Females as A Percent of All Army
accessions, 1970-84
Enlist
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Ncnwhite
Female (X) 21.7 18.9 19.1 20.1 23.3 17.7 24.0 24.8
Year" 1978 1879 1980 1981 1982 1983 1934
Ncnwhite
Eeniale(r) 35.4 45.2 44.4 40.6 31.9 32.9 36.7
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
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Another variable studied here is Age which is a factor
in changing social composition as described by Lacy: "Apart
from a minimum age below which it would not reach (age 18)
and a maximum beyond which it would not go (in World War II,
age 45) , America never did settle conclusively on a single,
preferred age of induction. Whether a 19-year-old makes a
better soldier than a 24-year old, and vice versa, remains a
matter cf disagreement within the defense community itself."
[Eef. 61].
Table 12 shows the mean age of Army Accessions by year.
As the table shows, the age of Army recruits has increased
little by little over the period. The highest mean age
occurred in 1980, and after then, almost remained constant
with ever age 20. Throughout the period the mode was age
18.
TABU 12
Th€ Mean Age of All Army Accessions by Year, 1970-84
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Age
11
19.6 19.5 19.1 19.3 19.6 19.8 19.6 19.7
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Age 19.8 19.8 20.0 20.3 20.2 20.2 20.0
Scurce: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower lata Center.
The marital status has been a good evidence in changing
social composition of recruits as obsevered by Charles C.
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Moskos and John H. laris: " Since E-4s during the draft
era, on the average, were older than present E-4s, the
comparison understates the increasing incidence of married
junior enlisted personnel. This increase runs counter to
national patterns where the clear trend is toward later
marriage." [Bef. 62]- Table 13 reveals the marital status
of the enlistees at time of entry.
TABLE 13
The Marital Status of All Army Accessions, 1970-84
(Percent)
Enlist






































Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
There was a sudden increase of married recruits in 1974
and 1975. Conversely the lowest percentage of the married
recruits occurred in 1978. This trends matched with periods
of the economic expansion and contraction, for example, tie
married recruits was increased in 1973-74, when the later
market had slackened, as it did in 1973-74, and was
decreased in 1976-79, when the labor market had declining
rates of unemployment. This means that "In the general
population young people seem to be postponing marriage, the
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tendency for first-term enlistees in the army to marry is
sharply higher. One could guess that the competitive pay
scales for junior enlistees have encouraged that trend."
[fief. 63].
E. EDUCATIONAL LEVEI
The next variable studied was the educational level
attained by the Army recruits. as Cooper asserted,
"Although it may be more common to view educational attain-
ment and mental aptitude in terms of job requirements, they
can also be viewed as indicators of social composition,
indeed, some have guestioned whether a volunteer military
would ccme to be populated by cnly the uneducated and
mentally inept." £Eef. 64]. Table 14 displays the
percentage of enlistees by year, whose highest level of
education falls into cne of the four broad categories.
A GEE equivalency was put into a separate category,
because these recruits did not complete the twelfth year of
education, although they are considered the same level as a
high school graduate. As demonstrated by Table 14, the
percentage of those with less than a high school diploma has
decreased over the period. The most dramatic changes in
percentages of those with at least a high school diploma
occurred twice, from 1976 to 1977 and from 1980 to 1981. In
1977 and 1981 there was a great increase in the percentage
of high school graduates enlisting, 16.2^ and 26. 5£ respec-
tively. This corresponds with a sudden decline in enlist-
ment of non-high school graduates. Especially, the decrease
of 26.2/? of enlistees with non-high school graduate is, by
comparison with 1980, a 79.45? reduction between 1980 and
1982.
To further analyze the education level of the Army's




Percentaqe D istribution of <krmy Accessions,
by Educational level , 1970-84
Enli St Non-High
School
GED High Some College Total
Year School and Over
70 39.9 2.3 40.0 17.8 100.0
71 38.2 5.6 42.0 14.2 100.0
72 34.8 8.8 45.1 11. 2 100.0
73 37. 5.0 50.5 7.6 100.0
74 37.1 9.3 47.8 5. 8 100.0
75 26.0 9.3 55.7 9.0 100.0
76 33.0 5.2 51.0 5.9 100.0
77 31. 1 4.2 59.2 5.5 100.0
78 22.3 5.0 66.7 6. 1 130.0
79 32.7 6.8 56.2 4.3 100.0
80 33.0 5.9 56.5 4.5 100.0
81 15.2 6.3 71.1 7.4 100.0
82 6.9 4.8 78.6 9. 8 100.0
83 7.0 5.9 76.6 10.6 100.0
84 5.8 4.7 79.6 9.8 100.0
Source : Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
_ -
graduates or non-high school graduates. This grouping
facilitated comparing educational attainment between races,
the sexes, and geographic regions.
The data in Table 15 shows the comparisons of the two
racial groups by their educational attainment.
Although both groups had an increase in the percentage
of high school graduates, the non-white group's gain was
much greater, 38.2% tc 29.4% respectively. This also repre-
sents a decrease in ncn-high school graduates in the ncn-
white group. That is, the rate between the white and the
nonwhite was 56.4% tc 43.6% in 1970, 94.6% to 5.4% in 1984
as can fce shown in Table 16.
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TABLE 15
Percent of Aray Accessions who were High School
Graduates, by Bace, 1970-84
Enlist
Year 1970 1S71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
White
Ncnwhit
58.1 56.4 56. 1 58.3 52.7




Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
White
Ncnwhit
69.5 56.4 56.4 74.5 86.0
e 78.2 66.6 70. 1 87.4 94.3
85.3 87.5
92.4 94.6




Percent of Army Accessions who were Non-High School
Graduates, by Bace, 1970-84
Year" 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
White 56.4 55.1 57.9 57.2 55.9 70.2 63.4 69.8
Ncnwhite 43.6 44.9 42.7 42.8 44.1 29.8 36.6 30.2
Enlist
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
White 78.2 66.6 70.1 87.4 94.3 92.4 94.6
Ncnwhite 21.8 33.4 29.9 12.6 5.7 7.6 5.4
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower lata Center.
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Table 17 displays the composition of the male and female
cohort by educational level.
TABLE 17
Percent of Army Accessions who were High School
Graduates, by Sex, 1970-84
Enlist
Year 1970 1571 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Male
Female
56.5 55.1 55.1 55.8 50.0








Year 1978 1S79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Male
Female
69.1 55.7 56.2 76.1 87.0









As illustrated by the data in this Table 17 r the male
cohort of high school graduates increased by 31.6% over the
period. The female cohort, on the other hand, increased by
8.6%. But nowadays they remain with almost 100£.
The geographic distribution of high school graduates was
also explored in Table 18.
The data in Table 18 are for the percentage of high
school graduates coming from each district over the period.
The 'ether* district increased 47.0% over the period. It
was the greatest advance and recently remain over 96%. The
south increased 36.55* over the time studied, followed by the
north central (3 1.5%), the northeast (28.7%), and the west
with the smallest increase (23.4%). However, the lowest
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TABLE 18
Percent of Arm y Accessions who were Hi
gs
School
Gradua tes, by District, 1970-
Enlist North- Korth South West Other
year east Central
1970 60.7 58.9 52.9 63. 8 49.3
1971 59.2 56.7 52.2 59.7 61.3
1972 59.3 58.7 52.8 56.9 66.0
1973 61.9 61.7 53.4 59.8 71.7
1974 55.2 53.3 52.4 53.7 67.8
1975 64.8 63.9 66.5 62.6 83.7
1976 59. 1 50.8 60.0 54.7 80.5
1977 63.7 60.1 68.0 45. 1 85.8
1978 74.5 68.6 75.2 67.5 90.2
1979 60.0 55.8 65. 1 52.7 81.8
1980 58.7 58.5 65.1 55.7 82.1
1981 76.9 77.3 80.1 76.7 93. 1
1982 87.9 89.4 88.6 85.6 97.2
1983 87.2 £8.5 78.2 84.5 96.4
1984 89.4 90.4 89.4 87.2 96.3
Source: Derived from data provided by De fense
Manpower Eata Center.
percentage of the high school graduates is the recruits
coming from the west (87.2%).
E. MINTAI APTITUDE
In addition to educational attainment, another indica-
tion cf social composition of enlistees is mental aptitude
as measured by the AFC.T mental group classification system.
The mental groups are based upon Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores recorded on the services*
data files. Using this system, the Army determines those
they consider eligible for technical training beyond recruit
training. Those who fall into Mental Groups I through III
the Army considers to have sufficient ability to finish
additional training. This group is composed of those who
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are in tie upper 50 percentile on the AFQT. These tests are
supposed to be normed to the entire OS population.
Table 19 provides data concerning the percentage of
recruits that were classified in the upper mental groups
(i.e.. Groups I to III), during the period, there was a 23.9
J decrease from 1970 through 1979, and a 32.9 % increase
from 1980.
TABLE 19
Percent of Amy Accessions who were in AFQT
Category I-IIIa, 1970-84
Year" 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
AFQT
I-IIIa 53.0 53.3 54.6 51.3 50.5 57.6 44.2 36.3
Enlist
Year 1978 1S79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
AIQT
I-IIIa 37.8 29.1 31.3 42.0 57.5 62.4 62.0
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Lata Center.
Talle 20 reports the classification by AFQT category
that was broken down ty racial group, that is, white and
nonwhite.
Although both racial groups increased their percentage
in the Mental Group (I-IIIa) , there was too small percentage
in the ncnwhite (37.3$) by comparison with the white
(71.27) .
Table 21 shows the percentage of recruits that were
classified by Sex. The percent of both males and females in
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TABLE 20
Percent of Amy Accessions who were in AFQT
Category I-IIIa, by Bace, 1970-84
Enlist
Year 1970 1S71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
White 58.0 58.7 61.2 58.6 57.6 64.3 52.5 46.2
Ncnwhite 21.8 23.2 27.6 31.8 31.6 35.7 24.4 16.4
Year
5
1978 1S79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
White 50.1 40.1 41.4 52.5 67.6 70.7 71.2
Ncnwhite 17.8 12.5 11.6 19.1 31.7 38.2 37.3
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Data Center.
TABLE 21
Percent of Amy Accessions who were in AFQT
Category I-IIIa, by Sex, 1970-84
Year" 1970 1 971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Male 53.4 52.5 53.1 52.1 50.1 56.1 43.9 33.9
Female 44.1 75.2 94.3 40.1 54.1 73.2 81.7 66.5
Year" 1978 1S79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Male 34.6 28.3 31.6 41.6 55.3 60.7 60.6
Female 58.0 34.7 29.4 44.3 73.4 74.5 71.8
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
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the upper mental groups increased. However, while the
female had a big increase from 44.1% to 71.8% over the
period, the male percentage increase was relatively modest
from 53.4? to 60.6%.
P. PABIII IHCOHE
The individual enlistee's family income was studied to
determine a trend in the economic status of the army's
recruits. Because of difficulty to obtain consistent data
over time, it is assumed that "families with high incomes
live in higher income areas than those with lower incomes.
In other words, the distribution of enlisted accessions
according to the income of individuals 1 home areas can also
be viewed as a proxy for the distribution of accessions
according to the inccne of individuals' own families.
Therefore, distributions of enlisted accessions according to
home areas provide a useful measure of how the economic
status of the force has varied over time." £Ref. 65]. So,
the average family income of a zipcode area was used as the
indicator of the economic status of the area.
The data used in this study are 1984 average family
income of each zipcode area, which was applied to the acces-
sions of each year from 1980 to 1984. The economic status
of a zipcode area over five year is assumed to be fairly
stable. Although this method has some limitation on accu-
racy, the trend to be shown should be indicative of the
actual trend.
An strong point in using only 1984 income data is that
it enable us to familiar with the update figures and elimi-
nates the need to adjust each year's income figures for
comparison.
Table 22 shows the percent range of average family
income of army accessions by district. Among the districts,
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TABLE 22
The Average Faaily Income of Army Accessions
by District, in Percentage Distribution, 1980-84
District and
iECome Level 1S80 1981 1982 1983 1984
Northeast 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0. 1 0.0
10000-14999 6.6 5.3 4.6 4.5 4.4
15000-19999 12.4 11.8 10. 6 10.2 10.3
2000C-24999 30.3 29.7 29.0 28.7 30.5
2500C-29999 26.3 27.5 28.3 28.8 28.4
30000-34999 14.1 14.6 15.3 15.6 14.9
3500C-39999 5.8 6.0 6.5 6.6 6.5
40000-44999 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.2 3. 1
45000-49999 0.9 1. 1 1.2 1.3 1.3
over 50000 0.7 1.0 1. 1 1.1 0.7
North Central 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0. 1
10000-14999 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5
1500C-19999 10.5 9.6 8.7 8.2 8.7
20000-24999 23.7 22.8 21.7 21.3 21.3
25000-29999 32.5 32-9 32.9 32.8 32.9
30000-34999 20.4 21. 1 21.5 22.4 22.2
3500C-39999 7.5 8.3 9.2 9.4 9.1
40000-44999 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.9
45000-49999 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9
over 50000 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
South 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.2 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0. 1
10000-14999 2.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4
15000-19999 25.2 24.6 22.0 21.2 21.3
2000C-24999 37.7 37.6 36.6 35.9 36.7
2500C-29999 20.1 20.8 21.8 22.6 22.0
30000-34999 8.0 7.9 9.3 9.5 9.5
35000-39999 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.8 4.8
40000-44999 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.2
4500C-49999 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
over 50000 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
West 10C 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0
10000-14999 1.5 1.5 1.2 1. 1 1.4
15000-19999 9.2 8.1 7.3 6.8 7.6
20000-24999 22.6 22.1 12.3 20.7 21.2
2500C-29999 3 1.7 31.6 18.9 32.0 32.4
30000-34999 19.3 19.6 21. 6 21.4 1 9.5
3500C-39999 10.2 11.2 11.5 11.7 1 1. 1
40000-44999 3.8 4.0 4. 1 4.3 4.7
45000-49999 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5
over 50000 0.4 1.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Eata Center.
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however, the Other district here was deleted, because she
had too small data. As the table reveals, there was very
little change in the income within each district over the
period. The greatest changes were among the districts them-
selves. The West was highest, followed by North Central
TABLE 23
The Average Family Income of Army Accessions
by Race, in Percentage Distribution, 1980-84
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Data Center.
Eace and
Income Level 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
White 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.1 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0
10000-14999 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2
15000-19999 11.2 10.8 9.8 9.7 9.9
20000-24999 28.0 27.4 26.3 26.4 26.8
25000-29999 30.3 30.5 30.7 30.5 30.5
30000-34999 17.0 17. 1 17.9 18.2 17.6
35000-39999 7.5 7.9 8.7 8.8 8.5
40000-44999 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5
45000-49999 0.9 1. 1 1. 2 1.2 1.2
over 50000 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Ncnwhite 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
10000-14999 6.5 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2
15000-19999 25.8 25.4 23.3 22.5 22.7
20000-24999 33.8 34. 1 33.2 31.7 33.0
25000-29999 15.3 19.9 20.9 22.0 21.5
30000-34999 9.3 9.4 10.9 11.4 11.0
3500C-39999 3.4 3.7 4. 1 4.5 4.3
40000-44999 1.1 1. 1 1.5 1.6 1.4
45000-49999 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5
over 50000 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0. 1
district, the Northeast, and the South. For example, under
$20000 of family inccme, when the highest and the lowest are
compared by percentage, there was a big difference between
56
the West (10.735-7. 93) and the South (28. 6%-23.7%) during the
given period. This «culd imply that the accessions coming
from the South district have poorer economic status than the
accessions coming frcm the West district.
The family income by race was also produced as can te
shown in Table 23. The interesting trend in the table is
the higher level of income of whites as opposed to
nonwhites.
TABLE 24
The Average Tanily Income of Army Accessions
by Sex, in Percentage Distribution, 1980-84
Sex and
lucerne Level 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Male 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.1 0.1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1
10000-14999 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3
15000-19999 15.9 15.3 13.6 12.9 13.2
2000C-24999 29.9 29.4 28.2 27.7 28.4
2500C-29999 26.8 27.2 28.0 28.3 28.0
30000-34999 14.5 14.8 15.9 16.5 15.9
3500C-39999 6.1 6.6 7.4 7.7 7.5
4000C-44999 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.0
45000-49999 C.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1. 1
ever 50000 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
Female 100 100 100 100 100
under 10000 0.2 0. 1 0. 1 0.1 0. 1
10000-14999 3.8 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.5
15000-19999 17.7 16.3 13.8 14.0 14.7
20000-24999 30.5 30. 1 23.6 28. 1 29. 1
25000-29999 24.9 26.8 27.6 28. 1 27.9
3C000-34999 13.6 13.8 15.7 15.9 15.3
3500C-39999 6.0 6.2 7.5 7.5 6.6
40000-44999 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.4
45000-49999 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0
over 50000 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Source: Derived from data provided by Defense
Manpower Lata Center.
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The ether computation of family income was baced on sex
Table 24 shows that the family income of female accessions
was greater than the male's family. This would contain the
new fact that the female commiDg from zipcode areas of high
income was much more recruited than the male.
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V. REPRESENTATIVENESS
The relevant population for the question of representa-
tiveness is the noninstitutionalized population ages 17
through 24 of all races and both sexes. This is the popula-
tion group most generally accepted for military service in
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Source:: Derived frcm data provided
Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
by Defense
The 17-24 age grcup represents 89.85 percent of the
131,222 Army recruits in 1982. In assessing the population
representation, therefore, it is useful to compare the
distribution of aggregate annual male and female accession
cohorts with the national population distribution of 17 to
24 year elds.
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The data for the U.S. population were taken from the
U.S. Bureau of Census Current Population and the 1984 and
1985 editions of the Statistical Abstracts in the United
States. Because some of the data are grouped into various
age catagories which encompass all or some of the ages in
the Army cohorts, it was necessary to adjust the data using
the weighted average technique.
A. GEOGRAPHIC
The first comparison was based on the geographic distri-
bution of two groups. Generally, "Balanced national repre-
sentation requires that the the Army recruit proportionally
from all sections of the Nation, avoiding dependence upon
any particular region." £Hef. 74] Table 26 shows the
regional distribution of the Army accessions and the U.S.
population. Percent difference cited this paper reper to
the percent differences of the Army to the relevant popula-
tions and were computed as follows: (Army % - Percent.
Population 7c)/Percent Population %.
The greatest difference between the two groups is in the
North Central, where there was a 17.82 percent over repre-
sentation in the Army based on the relevant population.
Also, Army accessions in the North East were under repre-
sented. Other two regions were over represented in the
Army. The 18-24 age group represents 82.4 percent of the
131,222 Army recruits in 1982-
B. BACE
Racial composition of the two cohorts was next examined.
The range of ages used to determine the sample use for
comparison was 17 to 24. Through the use of the weighted




Percentage Distribution of O.S. Population (18 -24)
and
Army Accessions (18 - 24) by Region, 1982
Region Population* Army Percent Difference
Northeast 20..64 17. 75 -14. 00
North Central 25..64 30. 21 + 17. 82
South 34. 02 35. 80 + 5. 23
W€St 19..70 16. 24 -17. 56
Total 100..00 100. 00
*Scurce: Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. :1984; and
Data provided by DMDC.
Note: Percent Difference = (Army-Population) /Population
TABLE 27
Percentage Distribution of O.S. Population (17 -24)
and
Army Accessions (17-24) by Race, 1982
Race U.S. Population* Army Percent Difference
White 83.71 70.14 -16.21
Elack 13.77 25.30 +87.36
Others 2.52 4.06 +61.11
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
*Scurce: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. :1984; and
Data provided by DMDC.
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The greatest difference between three groups is in the
Black, where there was a 87.36 percent over representation
in the Army based on the relevant population. Other group
was a 61-11 percent ever representation, but white group was
a 16.21 percent under representation.
Additionally, comparisons of the racial comparison
within the census regions to the racial composition cf
enlistees from each census region were made. The data
through the use of the weighted average technique are shown
in Table 28. This table shows the racial breakdown within
each region of both the relevant U.S. population and the
Army accessions between two Baces.
All regions were under representative of the white popu-
lation and were over representative of the black population.
The greatest discrepancy being 99.83 percent more blacks
from the Northeast in the Army than in the regional popula-
tion. The South on the other hand 23.88 percent fewer
Hhites enlisting in the Army than was representative of the
black civilian population and had 92.77 percent more blacks
enlisting in the Army than was representative of the black
civilian population. Black representation of the North
Central and of the West was larger than the relevant popula-
tion by 51.85 percent and 38.37 percent respectively and
white representative in two regions was smaller than the
relevant population by 6.48 and 2.84 percent respectively.
Table 29 shows the regional distribution between whites
and blacks in the Army and in the U.S.. This was limited to
persons 18 to 24 years of age and was used the weighted
average technique.
The whites were under represented in all regions except
in the Northeast, where they were over represented. The
Northeast was 34.01 ever representation in the whites based
on the relevant population. Elack representation of the




Army Accessions (18-24) ty Begion, by Race, 1982
Percentage Dist.rifcution^ Population (18-24) and






































Total 100. 00 100.00
*Scurce: Statistical Abstracts in the U.S. :1984; and
Data provided by DMDC.
populaticn by 4.56 and 37.15 percent respectively. Both the
South and the North Central were overrepresented based en
the relevant population. Also, both the Northeast and the
West regions were under represented based on the data in
Table 29. The North Central region was over represented by
both races and the Scuth region was over represented by
black and was under represented by white.
C. SEX
As Table 30 shows, 50.40 percent of the 18-24 year eld
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*Scurce: Statistical Abstracts in the U.S. :1984; and





Although the utilization of women increases, it is still
a predominately male organization. This distribution was
used to generate other estimates based on sex. The male and
female distributions within the White, Black and Other's
group were non egual. Table 3 1 displays the data for the
white and nonwhite group of the 18-24 year old U.S. popula-
tion ty Sex.
The greatest difference between the two groups is in
nonwhite male group, where there was a 205.3 percent over
representation in the Army based on the relevant population.
Also, nonwhite male group was more over represented than
white male group. White female group was less under repre-
sented than nonwhite female group.
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TABLE 30
Percentage Distribution of U.S. Population (18-24) a













Scurce: Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. :1984; and





ge Distribution of D.S. Population (18-24) and
Accessions (18-24) by Race and Sex, 1982























Table 32 compares the percentages of high school gradu-
ates of the 17-24 year old population and the 17-24 year old




ge Distribution of D.S. Population (17-24) and
Accessions (17-24) by Bace and Sex, 1982


















Source: Estimated from Census of Population :1980:
Statistical Abstracts of the D.S. :1984, 1985;
and Data provided ty DMDC.
As the data indicate, the Army was able to attract 16.35
percent more high school graduates than was representative
high school graduates than was representative of the whites
and tlacks. Also, in the Sex, the Army was able to attract
29.71 percent more high school graduates than was represen-
tative of the population.
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The black high schcol graduate group in the Army was
176.34 percent larger than the U.S. population while the
white high school graduate group was 4.47 percent large.
Also, the male high school graduate was a 195.19 percent
over representation, in the Army while the female high
school graduate was a 64.85 percent under representation
based on the relevant population. The percentage of male
and female graduates is shown to indicate the large poten-
tial source of manpower that the female represent.
I. FABIIT IHCOHE
The last area of comparison is family income. Because
the Army data were in 1984 dollars and the latest CPS data
were in 1982 dollars, it was necessary to adjust one for
compariscn. The 1984 dollars were deflated to 1982 dollars
using the consumer price index (CPI) . In this case the
deflated value was .9305, which was obtained from the 1985
Statistical Abstract of the United States. Also, the median
income of the Army recruits was calculated by fomula. (This
was introduced in Chapter III)
Table 33 shows the family income data. Only data rele-
vant to families were used to represent the relevant popula-
tion of the U.S. In all regions, the white Army recruits
came from the localities where the median family income was
substantially lower than the white regional median family
income, while the black recruits came from the localities
where the median family income was substantially higher than
the black regional median family income.
Among the black enlistees, the region with the lowest
percentage difference was the West, 15.02 percent and the
highest was the North Central with a 47.62 percent differ-
ence. Also, white enlistees in the South were the most
under represented by 22. 13 percent, based on the white
regional median family income.
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TABLE 33
Median Family Income of 0.5. and Army Accessions*
families in 1982, in 1984 dollars, by Region, by Bace
Region Race Population* Army % Difference
Northeast
Whit€ $ 25,815 $ 20,293 -21.39
Black $ 14,735 $ 17,412 +18.17
North Central
White $ 24,903 $ 21,612 -13.22
Black $ 12,374 $ 18,267 +47.62
South White $ 23,089 $ 18,063 -21.77
Black $ 13,044 $ 15,930 +22.13
West White $ 25,249 $ 21,916 -13.20
Black $ 16,508 $ 18,988 +15.02
*Source: Statistical Abstracts in the U.S. :1985; and
Data provided by DMDC.
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VI. SDMMABY AND CONCLOSIONS
This thesis was concerned with the socioeconomic trends
within the Army between 1970 and 1984 and its representa-
tiveness in 1982. The first part of the study explored the
historical context of representativeness and the progress of
the AVF. The concept of the individual' sright and obliga-
tion to serve in the defense of his (her) country has been a
major principle of O.S. military service and is the fcurda-
tion of a policy of representativeness in the military.
Next, the study examined individual and socioeccnomic
characteristics of all Army accessions between 1970 and
1984. These characteristics of the enlistees for each year
were compared to those of the other years and to a few of
draft years. From these comparisons trends within the
entering cohorts were detected.
Regionally, the percentage of Army enlistees from the
North Central increased from 22.59 in 1978 to 29.10 in 1984,
while that from the Northeast decreased from 19.94 in 1976
to 16. 4C in 1984. Tie percentage of Army enlistees frcm the
South increased from 34.96 in 1982 to 36.41 in 1984, while
that frcm the West was always less than draft periods. It
is interesting that the percentage of white group from the
South increased from 43.48 in 1978 to 64.32 in 1983, while
that of nonwhite group from the South decreased frcm 56.52
in 1978 to 35.68 in 1983. Alsc, the percentage of white
group frcm the Northeast increased from 70.17 in 1978 to
74.05 in 1984 continuously.
Racial compositicr was inspected, and it was found that
an increasing percentage of nonwhite people had entered the
Army from 13.9 in 1970 to 39.7 in 1979, and then the
percentage of nonwhite people decreased from 39.7 in 1980 to
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27.2 in 1984. This was a 18.6 percent annual growth rate
from 1970 to 1979 and a 6.3 percent annual reduction rate
from 1980 to 1984 in nonwhite enlistees.
There was an increase in the number of females entering
the Army's enlisted force from 1971 to 1 98 1 r but the numbers
have decreased somewhat since 1981. The annual growth rate
from 1971 to 1981 was 32.6 percent. But the percentage of
female enlistees decreased from 14.7 in 1981 to 12.1 in
1984. The percentage of white women increased from 18. S in
1971 to 45.2 in 1979, and then decreased from 45.2 in 1979
to 31.9 in 1982. Both nonwhite and white females increased
in terms of their percentage of all recruits.
Eegarding the traditional individuals of quality, educa-
tional level and mental aptitude, both increased since 1979.
The percentage of high school graduates increased from 60.4
in 1979 to 89.4 in 1984. Those in the upper half of the
mental group were only 29.1 percent of all recruits in 1979.
By 1984 this group was 62 percent of all entrants. This was
a 22.6 percent increase during that period. These data are
not adjusted for any possible misnorming of the various
tests used during the period.
The average family income of all Army enlistees has
remained constant over the period of 1980 through 1984.
Among the Districts the south had the recruits with the
lowest family income, while the West had the recruits with
the highest one. By Pace, the income of whites was greater
than that of nonwhites. By Sex, males were found to ccme
from families with higher incomes than those of females
females by a small difference.
Other characteristics studied included age at enlist-
ment. Particularly, between 1981 and 1984 the average age
of the recruits had decreased 20.3 years to 20 years, or
about 3.6 months. lastly, this study looked at representa-
tiveness of the 1982 cohort in terms ol the relevant
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civilian population. For comparison purposes it was often
necessary to take various age groups of the Army's acces-
sions because of limitations in available Census Bureau
data. In these cases, the Army data were adjusted so that
various percentages summed to 100.
Regionally the Northeast and West were under represented
by 14 percent and 17.56 percent, while the North Central and
South were over represented by 17.82 percent and 5.23
percent in terms of Army recruits it provided and its
percentage of total relevant population respectively.
In racial compositions, the white group was a 16.21
percent of under representation, while the black and other
groups were a 87.36 percent and 61.11 percent over represen-
tation tased on the relevant population. By regions, the
white participation rate of each region was less than the
white population rate of each region, while the black
participation rate of each region was more than the fclack
population rate of each region. This is very interesting in
the Army accessions. Particularly, Blacks of the Northeast
and South were over represented by 99.83 percent and 92.77
percent respectively.
In Sex, the males and females of nonwhite groups was
more ever represented than the those of white groups.
Particularly, the male of nonwhite group was a 205.30
percent ever representation based on the relevant
population.
The comparison of percentage of 17-24 year olds in the
O.S. population to 17-24 year olds entering the Army that
are high school graduates revealed that the black group was
a 176. "J4 over representation, en the other hand, the white
group was just a 4.47 percent over representation. Also,
the male group was a 195.19 percent over representation,
while the female group was a 64.85 under representation.
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The last comparison was made between family incomes.
Although the data available have limitations, the compari-
sons are considered valid indicators. In all regions, the
white median family incomes of the Army recruits were lcwer
than family incomes cf the civilian society, while the black
median family incomes of the Army recruits were higher than
family irccmes of the civilian society.
In conclusion, the "quality" of the Army's accessions
appears to have increased since 1979. Also, the utilization
cf nonwhites and women has somewhat decreased since 1979.
The Army was not representative of the recruite civilian
society in 1982. However, data seem to show improved repre-
sentation since 1979. The overall trends reflect that the
"quality" cf Army recruits and effectiveness of the Army
have gotten better since 1979. In addition, this study




A. MILITABY EHVIBONHINT AND SOCIOECONOMIC OVEBVIEW OF THE
BCK
1- KIIITABY ENVIRONMENT
KOBEA IS LOCATED IN THE HEABT OF THE FAR EAST. THIS
FUNDAMENTAL FACT OF geographic location has always been a
major factor in Korea's history. Surrounded by the ia:;cr
powers of Asia and tie Pacific -each vitally interested in
controlling the strategically located country- Korea has
become many times a tattle ground in a struggle for power.
To the Southeast, only 120 miles distant, lies Honshu, the
principle island of Japan. To the West, at about same
distance, lies the Shantung peninsula of China. Manchuria,
the Northernmost province of China, shares most of Korea's
Northern boundary. Finally, in the Northeast, for 11 miles
along the Trumen River, lies the Soviet Union. As a penin-
sula it has served as a bridge between powers on the conti-
nent of Asia and powers in the Pacific.
In ether words, a peninsula location has both the
advantage of easy access to adjacent culture when our nation
was strong and the disadvantage of becoming the target cf
aggressive neighbors when our cation was weak.
Historically, Korea was attacked 942 times. Even though
Korea delivered most cf cultures to Japan, most of attacks
were acted by Japan. Japan possessed Korea from 19 10 to
1945.
However, as seen as Korea was independent from Japan
on August 15 1945, the Korean peninsula was divided intc two
Koreas at the 38 th parallel. It was initially designated
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to serve simply as a line of demarcation for the acceptance
of Japanese surrender by Soviet and American troops. But
the line -a line of convenience- soon hardened into a sclid
boundary. This line was become as the "international fron-
tier" between the communist- . dominated world and the free
world.
On June 25 1S50, the North Korean Troops swept
across the 38 th parallel, slicing in four columns into the
Republic cf Korea with the aim of destroying the Rok
Government. The Korean war immediately became a matter of
world interest because of the importance of Korea's
geographical location, the simple fact of geographical
location once more became fundamental in Korea's history.
These days, the Korean peninsula is recognized as
one of dangerous area in the world. The danger from the
region is underscored by the Soviet anions' shooting dewn of
a RCK civilian airliner (KA1) and by the North Korean's
aggressive attitudes: invasion tunnels dug under the
Demilitarized zone (EPZ) 6 ambushes ROK and U.S. soldiers,
subversive efforts, a constant stream of bellicose propa-
ganda ficm radio of Ncrth Korea and provocative incidents
such as the Rangun Bombing as a recent evident. In ether
words, the Korean peninsula can be recognized as a very
important buffer zone between Communists and Free powers.
Specifically, the Korean peninsula is the one area
in the Northeast/Western Pacific basin where the interests
of the four major regional powers -Japan, People's repurlic
of China, USSR, U.S.- interest directly and significantly.
Therefore, if a conflict breaks out in the Korean peninsula,
the intervention of related super powers -U.S., USSR, China,
Japan- will be indispensable. So we can easily guess that a
6 North Korea was tunnel operations under the DMZ as part
of their overall concept of war. Three large tunnels have
teen discovered under the DMZ and as many as 17 others are
suspected.
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conflict in this area could lead to World War III.
Therefore the stabilization of the Korean peninsula is very
important to keep peace in the world as well as in the
Western Pacific and Ncrtheast Asian areas.
TABLE 34
A Comparison between ROk and North Korea in 1983













Source: The Posture of the Army and Department of the




















To keep the nilitary balance in the region, the
United States deploys 1 infantry Division, 1 or 2 Carrier
battle groups, 10 Tactical fighter Sguadrons, 1 marine
amphibious force and 1 Bomber wing and provides a nuclear
"Umbrella". The U.S. also maintains important bilateral
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1972-1982
( ) represents the estimate of 1985
Since the Korean Armistice of 1953, both North Korea
and ECK has steadily rebuilt their armed forces with the
assistance of their super power patrons. Table 34 shows the
comparison between Rck and North Korea Force in 1983.
The North Korean have vowed to reunite the Korean
peninsula under one government. The build up their armed
forces consumes 20 percent of North Korea's annual GNP and
continues at a rate beyond that required for legitimate
defensive purposes. The North Koreans deploy about half
their ccmtat forces near the border of the ROK. They stress
mobility, firepower, and shock action and maintain the capa-
bility tc launch an offensive on short notice. The BCK
continues its efforts to achieve an independent capability
to resist aggression but still U.S. support to deter or
counter a North Korean attack. The United States forward
deploys an Army Division plus Air and Naval force in Korea.
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However, these days economic power is also recog-
nized as a very important potential factor which improves
military force. Table 35 shows the comparison of economic
size and military spending of toth Koreans.
The ROK consistently higher economic growth rates
have helped it achieve a gross national product in 1982
about over four times that of the North, and the ROK's
economic edge is likely to beccme greater in the Future.
2 . Socioeconomic Overview of the Mill t§£X 2^ the RCK
The national security of the Republic of Kcrea (RCK)
is very important to the people of Korea. So the military
system of the ROK is staffed by mandatory conscription and
whomever becomes 20 years olds has to perform the burden of
defence. Korea has two kinds of soldiers in active duty.
One is a regular soldier and the other is a defense soldier.
The qualifications of a regular soldier require him to have
a high school diploma and be "A" class physical condition,
cf which the categories are classified as A, Ba, Bt and C.
However, college graduates can be regular soldiers even
though they are Ba class. The rest become the defence
soldier. The ratio between regular soldiers and defense
soldiers is 3 to 1.
The regular scldier lives in a traditional military
life style in barracks, while the defense soldier live at
home after work in the military during a given time. The
defense scldier performs his tour at the nearest military
unit tc his home. Mcst of defense soldiers work from C£: 00
to 17:00 and then go heme. Seme of them work from 17:00 to
08:00. Their tour periods are 365 days, which they work
actually 8 hours a day in their military units, not include
holidays.
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All enlistments of the Navy (including Marine Corps)
and Airforce are volunteers. Some of the Army enlistments
also are volunteers. Army recruits can volunteer as
Airborne troops r Military Police, Technical Units and NCO
members. But the duty period is different for each service.
The Army average is 30 months and the Navy and Airforce
averages are 32 months respectively. The reason why many
volunteers go the Navy and Airforce even though their duty
period is longer than the Army is that the Navy and Airforce
face less danger than that of the Army. Army enlistments
largely work in the IfiZ and the forward area against Ncrth
Korean scldiers.
But over college graduates among the regular
soldiers can reduce their duty period by 1-6 months, because
they received military training at their school. These
benefits often create conflicts between high school gradu-
ates and over college graduates.
The defense soldier mainly assists the regular
soldier. Also they wcrk as members of coast guard or night
watch with Regular scldiers. The regular soldier conducts
combat training and guard mission. Therefore the main jots
of the defense soldier consist of loading of supply, focd
service and carpentry, barbers, and ET, BT as well as Guard
soldiers. The defense soldier is primarily assigned to low
skill jobs and the regular soldier is primarily assigned to
high skill jobs. The regular soldier who graduated from
technical high school and college or university are assigned
to the high skill jobs. Also, some of the technical high
school graduates who acquired scholarships from the nation
have to work in the high school job for 5 years. These say
that the regular soldier and the defense soldier have good
harmony in performance respectively.
However, the conflicts between the regular soldiers
and the defense soldiers are very high. The main reasons
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are that the regular soldier have to live under given sched-
ules at barracks every day, while the defense soldier can go
home after work. Of course, the regular soldier have vaca-
tions of 15 days every 6 months. Table 31 shows that the
tasic daily schedules between the regular soldier and the
defense soldier.
TABLE 36
A Comparison of Basic Daily Schedules
Regular Defense




12:00-01:00 Lunch Lunch (Private)
01:00-17:00 Training Duty (or Training)
17:00-18:00 Supper
18:00-21:00 Free at Unit Free
21:00-22:00 Roll Call
22:00-06:00 Sleeping
* DMZ. Coast Guard act at eight
* Night Training and Night Watch are acted
The other differences letween the two soldiers are
the uniforms and salaries. Uniform color is not same and
salary is not given to the defense soldier. These facts
cause the regular to feel superior to the defense soldiers.
The regular scldier are classified into the two
kinds of the branches of service, that is technical service
or comhat service, by their carriers. They also decide
their ur.its by lottery system after finishing training. But
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lotterj system can cause unfairness for the rich, government
high officers and social high leaders. So the sons cf these
groups are classified differently and they largely have tc
work at forward areas and DMZ.
There are many officer training schools like the
Military Academy, BOTC and OCS, etc. The candidates of BCTC
are selected as volunteers during their junior 2 years and
they are trained for 2 years. Their main training is during
summer vacation and after commissioning. Most of them work
as platocn leaders during 2 years and can then discharged.
A few members who acguire a scholarship from nation have to
work for 5 years. The officers who graduated from military
academy have to work for 10 years and OCS officers can te
discharged after 2 years.
The EOK has 9 provinces and 3 large cities in
geographic regions. However, the geographic region is cot
the issue of manpower. The geographic region distribution
rates among the enlistments are almost the same and are
equally represented. But the geographic distribution in
General may be of some concern. Table 32 shows the General
geographic distribution. As Table 32 indicates, the Chief
of Staff came from Kyeong Sang Province since 1964. Perhaps
this night be a political reason.
Also, race conflicts don't exist in the EOK because
Korean are all the same race. Korean have a 5,000 year old
history. So Koreans have lived in the same culture tack-
ground and same language, etc. These are facts that
increase the Korean soldiers unit cohesion similar to
Israel.
The women in the military are volunteers and the
rate is below 0.5 percent. flomen mainly work as nurse offi-
cers, clerks, and secretary, etc. The low rate and poor
role cf women in the nilitary is due to the Korean cultural
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TABLE 37
LOS and Birthplace of the BOK Army Chief of Staff
Name Length of Service Place of Birth
Kim, Kye-Won Sep. '66 - Aug. '69 Kyeongsang*
Sc, Chong-chol Aug. '69 - June *72 Kyeongsang
No, Chae-hyon June * 72 - Feb. '75 Kyeongsang
Yi, Se-hO Feb. «75 - Feb. »79 Kyeongsang
Chong, Sung-hwa Feb. '79 - Feb. '79 Kyeongsang
Yi, Hui-song Dec. f 79 - Dec. '81 Kyeongsang
Hwang, Yung-si Dec. '81 - Dec. '83 Kyeongsang
Jung, Ho-yong Eec. »83- Kyeongsang
Source: Armed Forces $ Society, Vol. 11 No. 1, Fall
1984, P22
background. Korean dcn't like the participation of women in
all jcbs traditionally because of Confucianism.
The quality of EOK regular soldiers is getting
higher because college and university graduates have
increased. At present, the rate of regular soldiers which
graduated and are studing over college is about 30 percent.
In the recent past, the ROK government has allowed
the exemptions to a few people who are required in the
national development. They are a few people with of PhD or
Master degrees. Students who are studing at college or
university can defer their enlistment dates until their
graduate dates. But they have to work in the military after
graduation.
Those who evade the military service in the EOK are
very few. Because one who evades the military service can't
get a jol and is arrested some time or other.
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APPENDIX B




May 8, 1792 Enactment of the Militia Act of 1792; estab-
lished legal precedent for universal male
(white able-boded) obligation for state
militia service
Sep. 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania;
first call of state militia drafts for
federal service.
Dec. 1814 First national Conscription Bill; despite
strong support of President Madison,
Congress filed to pass bill.
Apr. 16, 1862 Conscription Act, Confederate States of
America; approximately 300,000 (1/3 cf
confederate total) drafted into military.
July 17, 1862 Militia Act: supplemented enlistments with
state militia drafts, reaffirmed universal
military obligation of able-bodied white
males, aged 18-45.
Mar. 2 1£63 Enrollment Act; implemented registration of
all white males between 20 and 45. Federal
Government assumed conscription authority
based on Constitutional powers of legisla-
ture, 170,000 subsequently drafted for civil
war (includes 118,000 substitutes).
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Hay 1 S 16 National Defence Act; reaffirmed use of state
militia for federal service, empowered
President to conscript up to 1 million.
May 18, 1917 Selective Service Act; 2.8 million men
inducted into Army during World War I.
June 4, 1920 National Defence Act; ended conscription,
reorganized peacetime regular army.
Sep. 16, 1940 Selective Service and Training; 4 5 million
men registered, 10 million drafted, extended
consciiption authority to March 31, 1947.
June 1G, 1948 Selective Service Act, extended before
outbreak of Korean War, various extended to
July 1, 1973.
June 1951 Universal Military Training and Service Act;
mandated a universal male obligation fcr
military service,
July 1, 1973 Draft Extension Act of 1971 expires, (last
actual conscription in Dec. 1972); author-
ized peacetime registration and classifica-
tion under the Selective Service System.
Apr. 1 1S75 President Ford ended requirement to register
with the Selective Service system.
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